Radio Spectrum Decision of the European Commission did create a framework for EU-wide spectrum policy making aimed at ensuring "co-ordination of policy approaches and, where appropriate, harmonised conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of radio spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in Community policy areas, such as electronic communications, transport and R&D" (Radio Spectrum Decision, Preamble 2), but the Commission has no spectrum to manage of its own and, as the preamble points out, continuously needs to ensure that its policy initiatives 
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses, in some detail, the main policy and regulatory evolutions in Europe up until February 2007, which are intended to contribute significantly to the introduction of systems and services relying on flexible spectrum management. Although business stakeholders as well as many academics consider necessary regulatory reform as a volatile and thus uncertain requirement for innovation, these reforms do not come about because of themselves. This is to say, policy action is in most cases undertaken as a result of constituency pressure, and information as well as persuasion flows, particularly in highly specialised and technical domains, guide the policy process throughout its conception, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases (Hogwood and Gunn 1984; Dunn 2004) . On the other hand, cabinets and administrations, which are sufficiently sensitive to future policy requirements and have the resources to exploit this sensitivity, may well devise policy and regulatory reforms well before an industry consensus around them takes shape.
In other words, the policy trends discussed in this paper are in most cases a mix of Government initiatives and a reaction to industry demands. Modern policy processes often provide both formal and informal channels through which stakeholders may influence these processes.
One difficulty of studying issues of spectrum policy in the European Union (EU) is that this policy domain is largely a competence of the Member States. The 2002 issues such as assignment and licensing procedures, or the decision whether to use competitive selection procedures for the assignment of radio frequencies, as well as audiovisual policies remain under the exclusive competence of the Member States.
The outline above is not intended to give an exhaustive overview of EU spectrum policy competences and procedures. What it aims to prove is that, for a significant part of the spectrum policy domain, there is no such thing as a European policy, even when taking into account all the harmonisation, consultation and planning procedures that are inherent to this specific policy domain and that take place not only on a regional, European level, but also on a multi-regional and global scale (eg via the ITU and its World or Regional Radio Conferences). Where EU-wide frameworks are created, national administrations -except in the case of Commission Decisions -have room for influencing policies and for implementing them according to their own time scheme and local priorities. Nevertheless, a number of trends in European spectrum policy are clearly visible, and are being implemented both on a EU-level (by launching consultations, creating regulatory frameworks and / or taking specific and binding measures for them) and by the Member States. In the sections below, some of these trends, which are of significant importance for the successful introduction of reconfigurable wireless systems, will be discussed. One of these is the introduction of spectrum trading, or secondary trading of spectrum; another is the evolution towards more dynamic forms of spectrum management which, on a Community level, is currently being given shape by the so-called Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS). As mentioned, it is impossible to draw out detailed policy roadmaps for these principles as this would imply a description of 25 Member States' policies.
Therefore we shall limit ourselves in this article to the Community-wide policy evolutions in these two domains, complemented by the current situation in some Member States, particularly the UK and Germany.
THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECTRUM TRADING
The introduction of spectrum tradeability constitutes significant evolution in spectrum policy, which is of great importance in the context of reconfigurable networks and services. As the European Commission puts it, "the concept of spectrum markets is a radical shift in how spectrum could be managed in Europe" (European Commission 2007a) . Indeed, in some countries, for more than a 100 years spectrum management has followed a so-called command and control model.
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In its most traditional form, this model means that administrations are both responsible for negotiating frequency allocations internationally, and deciding on precise usage of the bands as well as on the users permitted to use the frequencies (assignment).
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When there is spectrum scarcity, a beauty contest (ie a competition where frequencies are awarded based on what is considered to be the "best" offer, usually defined by a number of quantitative and / or qualitative criteria, and thus unlike an auction where the price offered is primordial) is usually held to decide who receives a licence to use the spectrum. In a market with relatively few players, this was (and still is) a system which gives administrations maximal knowledge on spectrum activity, relatively large degrees of control over spectrum usage and moreover minimised interference between services making use of spectrum.
However, many problems have arisen with this dirigiste approach to spectrum management. Particularly in the US, beauty contests started to be challenged in court as demand started to outweigh supply, and were gradually replaced, first by lotteries and eventually by auctions. As a consequence, beauty contests became considered as being too unpredictable and, in those countries where the command and control system was applied, this system was criticised for the perceived slowness and inherent inflexibility with which government administrations manage the spectrum, resulting in tardy adaptations to technological innovation, heavy influencing by lobbying and an excessive emphasis on avoiding interference, leading to suboptimal use of spectrum; moreover some authors claim that governments, unlike private companies, do not have the incentive to find the most efficient and popular use for spectrum, because contrary to enriching them (as it would private entities) such modifications only imply a higher workload for these administrations (Benjamin 2003; Analysis & Partners 2004; Ofcom 2005b; WIK 2006) .
The introduction of auctions marked the start of a second model for spectrum management, namely market mechanisms. the idea behind this is that "efficient spectrum markets will lead to use of spectrum for the highest value end use" (FCC 1999:32) , because the parties that have identified the highest value (ie revenues) for the spectrum will be willing to pay the most for it, and will win the auction. A second step in this process is to allow obtained spectrum licenses to be traded between players, meaning that spectrum usage rights are transferred from one party to another in a secondary market.
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The economic significance of this is that, apart from confronting the cost of acquiring spectrum through an auction, the licensee also needs to address the cost of retaining its spectrum, and will not do so if its value is suboptimal, leading to more efficient use of frequencies (WIK 2006:12) . A principle often quoted to denote the importance of tradeability of spectrum is the Coase theorem, which states that "the initial allocation of a good does not matter from an efficiency perspective so long as property rights are clearly defined and the goods can be freely exchangedbecause, provided that there are no frictions in the trading process, exchange will lead to an efficient outcome" (Coase 1961 , quoted in Analysis & Partners 2004 Ofcom, 9 is not very far from the actual allocation today), when there is sufficient spectrum available for licenceexempt use, market forces should be the guiding principle for the assignment of usage rights (WIK 2006:8; Ofcom 2005b:5) . In this article we therefore limit ourselves to the discussion of policy steps towards these market based principles. However, we do come back to this balance between different models of spectrum management in the concluding section of this article. As with flexible spectrum usage, several countries inside as well as outside of the EU are currently taking steps to introduce secondary trading. In the UK, for example, Ofcom has outlined a roadmap towards assigning almost three quarters of the spectrum via market mechanisms (see Table 1 the issue. The Spectrum Trading Statement contained a class-by-class timetable for the introduction of spectrum trading, which can be found in Table 2 The European Commission has followed these trends, taking steps to create a regulatory framework for the introduction of spectrum trading. First of all, the (nonobligatory) possibility to introduce secondary trading was included in the new regulatory framework (Art. 9 §3), which was approved in 2002 and came into force in Washington by former Information Society Commissioner Liikanen is also included: "In Europe we have a legacy of different national measures and approaches which are still standing in the way of many of the possible innovative approaches to spectrum management. That said, it is imperative that we advance and we can learn from the US.
Jointly we should be able to develop a series of innovative approaches which are of interest world-wide".
12 A proposed set of suitable bands is also outlined in this section of the report. 14 The Analysis et al study expected these to amount to EU8-9 billion per year, whereas another mentioned study by Jerry Ellig from the George Mason University calculated an annual gain of USD 77 billion in the US, claiming that "spectrum allocation accounts for more than two-thirds of the total costs of federal telecommunications regulation to consumers and society." 15 This argument seems rather questionable since there currently still does not exist an internal market for services that are already harmonised throughout Europe (eg 2G and 3G services). Various obligations ranging from national roaming obligations to interconnection tariffs are highly diverging throughout the EU. A harmonisation at the EU implies a solution for all of these differences besides technical parameters, which might prove to be a slow and difficult process.
16 Including terrestrial mobile communication services (public services such as 2G and 3G, and closed ones such as PMR and PAMR), terrestrial fixed-wireless communication services (such as WLL, BWA and microwave links) and terrestrial TV and radio broadcast services. Interestingly, Public Service Broadcasting is not excluded from this:
"While the special nature of public service broadcasting has to be taken into account, it should be recognised that the possibility for spectrum users to trade and use the frequencies in a more flexible way are options and not obligations. It may also be necessary to reassess the assumption that broadcasting as a public interest automatically requires terrestrial spectrum, since coverage obligations increasingly can be fulfilled by means other than terrestrial wireless transmission, given the growing reality of convergence and multiple platforms. This does not contradict the objective to safeguard the delivery of public service broadcasting, nor the continuing validity of other public policy objectives." aspect deals with transitory issues, ie the safeguarding of existing licence holders' interests (eg by giving them increased flexibility of use) and compatibility with competition and general community law, while a fourth is concerned with the definition of spectrum rights. The necessary co-ordination of information through the creation of Europe-wide databases for allocations, assignments, spectrum availability and regulations 17 is a fifth priority for harmonisation. A final issue is service and technology neutrality wherever consumer demands (eg interoperability) do not justify limitations on these concepts. The Commission proposes to include the issues of tradeability (1st) and technological and service neutrality (6th) during its framework review, whereas a co-ordination process will be started to reach the other four objectives. 18 To this needs to be added that several Member States, while sharing the views of the EC on the objective, ie to optimise spectrum management, have diverging views with respect to the means that should be employed to reach such optimal use of the spectrum. For example, some regulators feel that public interest objectives such as the need to protect users from harmful interference, are not necessarily considered compatible with an exclusive market based spectrum management. Similarly, the claim of the EC to significantly increase the amount of "commons bands", according to some of these regulators, is challenged by the fact that it would certainly lead to sharing and compatibility issues, at least as long as smarter technologies (including cognitive radio) are not available to make sure that these difficulties would not arise. A third point of criticism is that market based mechanisms cannot ensure the availability of harmonised frequency bands at the European level while such possibility of harmonisation is necessary for industry to develop new and innovative services and applications. Finally, some of the regulators also believe that present regulation provides enough guarantees in terms of technology neutrality, and fear that reinforced provisions will lead to either an inefficient use of the spectrum or to harmful interference. This demonstrates the point made earlier that a "European" spectrum policy is in reality hard to define. concerning wireless access platforms for electronic communications services (WAPECS) (European Commission 2004b). This move was spurred not only by the fact that more and more wireless technologies were becoming available for which suitable spectrum needed to be found (802.11x, 802.16, UMTS-HSDPA, LTE, DAB and the DVB family, just to name a few), but also it was felt 19 that present spectrum policies could be made more flexible, with less stringent licencing schemes attached to the use of numerous frequency bands, so as to encourage fast introduction of innovative and competitive services and, thus, facilitate the development of the internal market. that "in order for competition to bring consumers the highest valued services in the most efficient manner, we believe competing users of spectrum need flexibility to respond to market forces and demands. This flexibility includes the freedom to determine how they will use spectrum, how much spectrum they need, and the geographic area in which they will provide service" (Rosston & Steinberg 1997:10) . proposed "making licences more inherently flexible by removing unnecessary or disproportionate restrictions so users could change use or technology without applying to Ofcom" (Ofcom 2005b:32) . The UK regulator believes that up to 72% of spectrum may be liberalised in this manner, "allowing change of use of spectrum without any intervention and with no specific restrictions, although possible usage will be limited through the use of a spectrum mask" (Ofcom 2005c:51) . 24 In the beginning of 2005, the regulator published its Spectrum Framework Review Implementation Plan. In this report, while still wholeheartedly supporting the evolution towards flexibility in spectrum usage and announcing that it would in the future remove restrictions in existing as well as new licences as much as possible, Ofcom did discern two issues which justify a temporary delay of usage restrictions removal as far as 3G licences are concerned, the first being the sheer magnitude of change that spectrum management is currently undergoing and possible short-term negative effects of this change on the commercial plans of the five existing mobile network operators, and the second being that certain frequencies had recently been auctioned to fixed services and that the terms of this auction -at least for a limited period of time -needed to be respected. In practice, several options for the introduction of these principles were put forward, including immediate release of The WAPECS system would thus theoretically allow any digital technology over any platform to offer any service possible (including IP access, multimedia, multicasting, interactive broadcasting and datacasting) over any frequency band (both licenced and unlicenced) and / or network, while recognising that such an approach is subject to technical co-existence requirements tailored to each specific band.
As a second step, the RSPG launched a questionnaire among its members regarding current and intended usage of a pre-defined list of wireless platforms, aimed at identifying the relevant frequency bands for WAPECS, the range of licencing approaches which have or could be used, the rights that have been applied, the obligations that have been applied and some spectrum related challenges. From this the Group compiled a first list of broadcasting, fixed, mobile and Short Range Device The longterm policy goals in their turn may be summarised as the need to facilitate rapid access to spectrum for new technologies in order to promote competitiveness and innovation, to ensure a coherent authorisation scheme and to achieve technological as well as service neutrality (RSPG 2005a:12-14) .
However, the RSPG is careful in its approach to WAPECS and points out a certain number of challenges to be addressed by the MS that justify a certain level of continued regulation and co-ordination: 1) ensuring access to adequate amounts of spectrum to meet the needs of consumers and business in the future environment without disadvantaging services of general interest (such as public-sector broadcasting) and without picking technology winners; 2) increasing flexibility and enhancing harmonisation: removing regulatory constraints on the electronic communications services to be offered but, where justified, keeping some on the technologies to be used as this will facilitate identifying what appropriate minimal technical co-existence requirements to avoid the risk of interference must be met and maintaining the protection of other services and applications (eg governmental services); 3) maintaining a stable and predictable regulatory framework; 4) avoiding spectrum fragmentation where it could lead to inefficient use of spectrum, by carefully considering the effects of the reduction of the regulatory constraints on harmonised bands; 5) facilitating standardisation through, at least, the establishment of a harmonised set of technical requirements for the usage of certain frequency bands to benefit from economies of scale; 6) identifying transition arrangements which ensure that legacy issues are dealt with smoothly.
In its opinion, the RSPG also recognised that, while the conditions of authorisation should be equitable between similar electronic communication services potentially operating in various frequency bands, using different technologies but which target similar mass markets, there are still reasons which would prevent and will continue to prevent consideration of the same access conditions to all networks. Similarly it recalls that certain technological requirements may be imposed by Member States or at EU level.
With regard to the implementation of WAPECS, the RSPG argued that whereas a revolutionary, "big bang" approach would potentially distort existing services, it would be equally unwise to wait for all existing licences to expire, and therefore proposes that specific actions and dates for implementation be set out in detail, initial, coherent set of bands (repeating the steps and motivations already outlined above) and sets out a specific outline for 2007. In general, the Commission proposes "that a flexible, non-restrictive approach to the use of radio resources for electronic communications services, which allows the spectrum user to choose services and technology, should from now on be the rule, as opposed to the restrictive approach which is often still used today. Measures which deviate from the new approach may still be taken, but must be duly justified (eg for public safety and security) and take into account their impact on innovation, competition, investment and social value" 26 (European Commission 2007c:5) While still holding to the obligation to offer services within particular frequency bands, the Commission aims to remove exclusive use of frequencies and to counter harmful interference through the use of technology-neutral, usage conditions with regard to channels, power limits and guard bands. Besides the earlier mentioned 2G bands which need to be opened up for 3G services, the Commission gives the current examples of the 2.6Ghz band desired by WiMax as well as UMTS operators and the 470-862Mhz band now used primarily for broadcasting to further show the urgent need for introducing such steps towards flexibility. Therefore, the focus of this article on market-driven spectrum management certainly does not imply that this approach is uncontested or acted upon with identical vigor in all EU Member
States, but rather tries to shed light on this specific, promising aspect of spectrum management reform. Additional regulatory, economic and business modeling studies will need to be carried out in order to evaluate whether flexible spectrum management is indeed feasible, profitable and innovation-inducing and will as such dominate other management mechanisms in the future. 
